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1. Introduction
Because all of a firm’s major strategic and financial decisions (including capital increases,
mergers, acquisitions, or recruiting executives) must be approved by the Board of Directors,
a firm’s board plays a key role in corporate decision-making. Importantly, according to the
academic literature, this decision-making process is significantly affected by the composition
of the board. For instance, it has been argued that independent outside directors (Baysinger
and Butler, 1985; Fama and Jensen, 1983), independent or dual board leadership (Brickley et
al. 1997; Rechner and Dalton, 1989, 1991) board size (Jensen, 1993; Pearce and Zahra, 1992;
Yermack, 1996) or board gender diversity (Adams et al., 2011; Francoeur et al., 2008; Matsa
and Miller, 2013) can influence corporate outcome.
With regard to the latter point, most of the existing literature has focused on how female
board members affect firm’s financial performance so that very few studies have analyzed the
link between gender board composition and firm risk-taking. However, many studies showed
that women are more risk averse than men (Byrnes et al., 1999). Recently, it has even been
suggested that an increased participation by women in decision-making would have made it
possible to avoid the subprime financial crisis (Rhode and Packel, 2010). Thus, by restraining
the boldness of male directors in highly risky ventures, female directors could reduce the ex-
cessive risk-taking of boards (Dowling and Ali Aribi, 2013). An increased presence of women
in decision-making positions could affect the risk-tolerance of a firm and, consequently, its
performance (Berger et al, 2012).
We supplement the existing literature on corporate governance by providing results on the
link between gender board composition and firm risk-taking. To our knowledge, our study
is the first one to directly address the impact of the appointment of female directors on the
risk-taking of U.S. firms and to consider all S&P 100 firms. The remainder of this paper is
organized as follows: Data and methodology are presented in Section 2. The empirical results
are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2. Data and methodology
2.1 Sample
To carry out the study, all of the relevant proxy statements for each firm belonging to the
S&P 100 index were obtained from the Securities and Exchange Commission website. In
most of cases, the exact date of the appointment (day/month/year) was disclosed in the proxy
statements. Where the date of appointment was not disclosed on the proxy statement, we
obtained this information using Lexis Nexis, Thomson One Banker, and/or Bloomberg. In so
doing, we were able to determine the exact composition of the 100 boards of directors and to
follow the day-to-day changes between 1994 and 2010.
We have systematically excluded multiple appointments (when at least two directors what-
ever their gender were appointed on the same date) because of the empirical impossibility of
isolating the impact of the individual directors. Although this greatly reduced the number of
observations, it guaranteed a non-biased sample. We choose the S&P 100 Index, which is a
sub-set of the S&P 500 index, because it measures the performance of large cap companies in
the United States. Its constituents represent about 57% of the market capitalization of the S&P
500 and almost 45% of the market capitalization of the US equity markets.
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We distinguished between the appointment of women and men, and, as one would expect, the
number of male appointments was higher than the number of female appointments. Neverthe-
less, some substantial differences appear between industries. In general, we observed a higher
percentage of female appointments for consumer discretionary, consumer staples, and health
care firms but a lower percentage for energy and industrial firms. Our results are consistent
with Harrigan (1981). However, two findings are particularly striking. First, we observed a
high percentage of female appointments in information technology firms (23%). Generally,
since information technology firms are seen as open and democratic firms, this could increase
the likelihood of women breaking through the "glass ceiling." Second, our results indicate that
the frequency of female appointments in financial firms is disproportionately low (12%). These
results are contrary to those of Harrigan (1981), but could be explained by Del Prete and Ste-
fani’s (2013) negative correlation between risk-taking and the presence of women on boards.
The drive for high yields in the short term is often a driving consideration for financial firms.
Therefore, the fact that women are assumed to be more risk adverse could help explain why
women are not preferred by financial firms.
2.2 Methodology
We examined the association between board gender diversity and firm risk level. More
specifically, we analyzed how the appointment of a new board member (male or female) af-
fected the firm risk level. We use three different measures of risk (total risk, systematic risk,
and unsystematic risk) and compare firm risk level before the addition of new members (both
male and female) to the corporate board to the risk level after such additions.
2.2.1 Total risk
If risk is defined as the chance of achieving returns lower than expected, it would be logical
to measure risk by the dispersion of the possible returns below the expected value. A more
specific measure of total variability of returns is the standard deviation of asset returns, where
the total risk of an asset i over the period t is defined as follows:
Total risk= σRi,t
Total Risk is made up of two types of investment risk: systematic and unsystematic risks.
We may use the market model to quantify these risks:
Ri,t = βRm,t + εi,t with εi,t ∼ N(0,σ
2
εi,t
) (1)
σ2Ri,t = β
2σ2Rm,t +σ
2
εi,t
The model (1) describes the link between the return of an asset i (Ri,t) and the return of the
market (Rm,t). As this model is a statistical model, we need to add an error term (εi,t). The total
risk (σRi,t ) of the asset i may be broken in two parts: (i) the market risk which is called system-
atic risk (βσRm,t ) because it cannot be removed by diversification and (ii) the asset-specific risk
which is called unsystematic risk (σεi,t ) because it may be reduced by diversification.
2.2.2 Market risk
The type of risk that cannot be diversified away because it affects the market as a whole is
called the market risk or systematic risk. This type of risk cannot be eliminated by combining
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individual securities in a well-diversified portfolio. Using the definition of the model (1), the
market risk is equal to β times the standard deviation of the market return:
Market risk= βσRm,t (2)
where β indicates how sensitive the security return is to changes in the market level and σ2Rm,t
represents the variance of the market returns.
2.2.3 Diversifiable risk
The risk that disappears through diversification is called diversifiable risk. Using the defi-
nition of the model (1), the unsystematic risk is equal to the standard deviation of the residual
return factor ε, or:
Unsystematic risk= σε = σRi,t −βσRm,t (3)
where σRi,t represents the standard deviation of the asset returns, β indicates how sensitive the
security return is to changes in the market level and σRm,t represents the standard deviation of
the market returns.
Following the methodology of event study, we used a 65/130/195/260 day pre/post estimation
window and a 21-day event window (-10, +10) with 0 representing the event day. Modifying
the length of the estimation window allowed us to study the impact of an appointment on the
firm’s risk levels in the very short (65 days), short (130 days), medium (195 days) or long-term
(260 days).
For each appointment, we compared the risk level before and after the appointment. More
precisely, we computed the total risk σRi,t for the firm i, t days before and after the appointment
where t equals to 65, 130, 165 and 260. The market risk was computed as Equation (2) where
the index market corresponds to the S&P 500 and the β is estimated out of estimation window.
The unsystematic risk was computed as Equation (3). To conduct a comparative analysis, we
tested for each type of risk the following hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 0 (H0): the risk level is the same before and after the appointment.
• Hypothesis 1a (Ha1 ): the risk level before the appointment is higher than the risk level
after the appointment.
• Hypothesis 1b (Hb1 ): the risk level before the appointment is lower than the risk level
after the appointment.
To distinguish between the appointment of a man and a woman, we computed the number of
times each (H0, H
a
1 and H
b
1 ) hypothesis was accepted. Then for each hypothesis, we applied a
proportion test to evaluate the relation between gender and risk.
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3. Empirical results
We first considered the whole sample, that is to say the 100 firms included in the S&P100 index.
They indicate that there is no significant gender difference in the risk level before and after the
appointment of a director whatever the length of the estimation window and the considered type
of risk. Interestingly, we note that the impact of a director’s appointment on the three types of
risk increases as time goes by (since the frequency of Ha1 and H
b
1 increases and the frequency
of H0 decreases with time). In other words, the impact of the appointment of a director on
firm’s risk (whether positive or negative) increases with time. This validates our decision to
use different lengths of estimation windows and is consistent with the idea that the effects of
a change in the board composition may be difficult to detect in the short-term. Moreover, in
most of cases, the announcement of the appointment of a new director (male or female) had
no impact on firm’s systematic risk. This result implies that the increase in the firm’s total risk
after some appointment is only due to the firm’s increase in the unsystematic risk. We noted
that the positive impact on a firm’s systematic risk, i.e. the fact that the risk is lower after the
appointment, increased with time but that there were no significant differences between men
and women. The results for the whole sample have to be studied with caution since they could
conceal some effects specific to some industries or to firm characteristics.
As the inclusion of women at the strategic decision-making levels may not carry the same
weight and importance for different industries, we decided to conduct the same analysis by
industries. The results of the proportion tests for risk by industry offer some very interesting
results. Concerning the impact on the total risk, consistent with the results obtained for the
whole sample, we observed no distinction between the impact of female appointments and
of male appointments in the very short term. However, we cannot dismiss completely the
existence of a gender impact when a director is appointed if we consider the short, the medium
or the long-term effects. Thus, the appointment of a woman more frequently decreases the total
risk level for firms in the consumer discretionary industry (in the long-term), in the consumer
staples and in others industries (in the medium-term), in the energy and in the health care
industries (in the short-term) but more frequently increases the total risk level for industrial
firms (in the medium-term).
Conversely, the appointment of a man increases the total risk level for firms in the consumer
discretionary industry (in the long-term), for firms in other industries (in the medium-term), in
the energy, the financial and the health care industries (in the short-term), information tech-
nologies firms (in the long-term), and financial firms (in the medium-term). Thus, the impact
of a director’s appointment on the total risk differs according to (i) the considered industry and
(ii) the estimation window.
The results concerning the systematic risk show that a male appointment reduces more
frequently the systematic risk than a female appointment for firms in the consumer discretionary
industry (in the short-term), in the consumer staples industry (in the very short and in the long-
term), in the health care industry and industrial firms (in the long-term). On the other hand, a
female appointment has a more positive impact on firm systematic risk than a male appointment
in the energy industry (in the medium-term), for financial firms (in the very short, medium and
long-term) for firms in the information technologies industry and firms in other industries (in
the short, medium and long-term).
Finally, our results indicate a gender effect on the unsystematic risk depending on firm’s
industry. The appointment of a male director more frequently increases the unsystematic risk
than the appointment of a female director for firms in the consumer discretionary industry
(in the medium term), for firms in the energy industry (in the short, medium and long term)
and in the health care industry (in the very short, short, medium and long-term) and decrease
593
Economics Bulletin, 2014, Vol. 34 No. 1 pp. 589-604
Table 1: Summary of results of proportion test by industry
Positive impact Negative impact
Female’s appointment
Total risk Cons. Dis. (+) Industrials (-)
Cons. Staples (+)
Energy (+)
Health Care (+)
Others (+)
Systematic risk Energy (+)
Financials (+++)
Info. Tech. (+++)
Others (+++)
Unsystematic risk Energy (+) Industrials (-)
Financials (+) Cons. Staples (-)
Health Care (+++) Others (-)
Industrials (+)
Male’s appointment
Total risk Info. Tech. (+) Cons. Dis. (-)
Financials (+) Energy (-)
Financials (-)
Health Care (-)
Others (-)
Systematic risk Cons. Dis. (+)
Cons. Staples (++)
Health Care (+)
Industrials (+)
Unsystematic risk Others (++) Cons. Dis. (-)
Energy (- - -)
Health Care (- - - -)
(+), (++), (+++) and (++++) mean that the appointment has a significant positive impact for 1, 2, 3 or 4 out 4 event windows, respectively.
(-), (- -), (- - -) and (- - - -) mean that the appointment has a significant negative impact for 1, 2, 3 or 4 out 4 event windows, respectively.
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more frequently the unsystematic risk than the appointment of a female director for firms in
other industries (in the medium and long-term). Conversely, the impact female directors on the
unsystematic risk is more frequently positive than the impact of male directors in the energy
industry (in the medium-term), for financial firms (in the short-term) in the health care industry
(in the short, medium and long-term) and more frequently negative for firms in other industries
and in consumer staples industry (in the long-term). For industrial firms, in the medium-term,
women have both more frequently a positive and a negative impact than men (which means
that men have more frequently no significant impact on the unsystematic risk). Interestingly,
we noted no differences between male and female appointments on firm unsystematic risk for
firms in the information technologies.
Our significant results are summed up in Table 1. First, we can see from this table that
female appointments more frequently have a significant positive impact on firms’ risk than a
significant negative impact. Thus, from this point of view, the appointment of female direc-
tors seems to be beneficial to shareholders particularly since the results for male appointments
show less frequently a positive impact on firms’ risk. Regarding total risk, a female presence
on boards could be particularly beneficial in industries such as consumer discretionary, con-
sumer staples, energy and in health care, while a male presence on boards would be beneficial
to industries such as information technologies and financial firms. In general, these results are
consistent with Daily et al. (1999), who argued that women play a key role in industries char-
acterized by high levels of female buyers such as consumer products. However, we have to
admit that we find only limited evidence of a positive impact since our results are significant
only for 1 estimation window out of 4. Consistent with Daily et al. (1999), we noted a strong
positive impact of female appointments (for 3 estimation windows out of 4) and a strong neg-
ative impact of male appointments (for 4 estimation windows out of 4) on unsystematic risk
for health care firms. Our results are more robust for the systematic risk. For 3 industries, we
discovered a significant positive impact of female appointments for 3 estimation windows out
of 4. Thus, the presence of women on boards seems to be critical to reducing the systematic
risk in industries historically considered as male such as information technologies and financial
firms.
4. Conclusion
We supplement the existing literature on corporate governance by providing results on the link
between gender board composition and firm risk-taking. More specifically, we studied the
effect of the appointment of new directors (male and female) on a firm’s risk level in light of
three risk indicators (total risk, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk). Thus, we compared
the risk level before the new member’s appointment to the risk level after the new member’s
appointment.
First, we considered the whole sample, that is to say the 100 firms included in the S&P100
index. The results indicated that there is no significant gender difference in the risk level before
and after the appointment of a director whatever the considered type of risk and the length of
the estimation window. Interestingly, we showed that no appointment (whatever the gender
of the director) increased firm’s systematic risk. Therefore, increases in firm’s total risk after
a director appointment is only due to the firm’s increases in unsystematic risk. Nevertheless,
these results could conceal some effects specific to some industries or to firm characteristics.
Therefore, we decided to conduct the same analysis by industry. Our main results can be
summed up as follows. First, we noted that, industry-by-industry, the appointment of a female
director more frequently has a positive impact on firm’s risk than the appointment of a male
director. Second, a director’s appointment on the total risk differs according to the considered
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industry: female presence on boards could be particularly beneficial in industries such as con-
sumer discretionary, consumer staples, energy and in health care, and male presence on boards
such as information technologies and financial firms. Regarding the systematic risk, the impact
of female appointments is particularly strong for financials, health care and firm in other indus-
tries, i.e. industries historically considered as male industries. We also note a gender effect on
the unsystematic risk for firms in the health care industry.
References
Adams, R.B., S. Gray, and J. Nowland (2011) "Does Gender Matter in the Boardroom? Evi-
dence from the Market Reaction to Mandatory New Director Announcements" SSRN working
paper.
Baysinger, B.D. and H.N. Butler (1985) "Corporate governance and the board of directors:
Performance effects of changes in board composition" Journal of Law, Economics, and Orga-
nizations 1, 101-124.
Berger, A.N., T. Kick, and K. Schaeck (2012) "Executive board composition and bank risk
taking" Deutsche Bundesbank working paper number 03/2012.
Brickley, J.A., J.L. Coles, and G. Jarrell (1997) "Leadership structure: separating the CEO and
Chairman of the board" Journal of Corporate Finance 3, 189-220.
Byrnes, J.P., D.C. Miller, and W.D. Schafer (1999) "Gender differences in risk taking: A meta-
analysis" Psychological Bulletin 125, 367-383.
Daily, C.M., S.T. Certo, and D.R. Dalton (1999) "A decade of corporate women: Some progress
in the boardroom, none in the executive suite" Strategic Management Journal 20, 93-99.
Del Prete, S. and M.L. Stefani (2013) "Women on italian bank boards: Are they "gold dust"?"
Banca d’Italia working paper number 175 .
Dowling, M. and Z. Ali Aribi (2013) "Female directors and UK company acquisitiveness"
International Review of Financial Analysis 29, 79-86.
Fama, E.F. and M.C. Jensen (1983) "Separation of ownership and control" Journal of Law and
Economics 26, 301-325.
Francoeur, C., R. Labelle, and B. Sinclair-Desgagne (2008) "Gender diversity in corporate
governance and top management" Journal of Business Ethics 81, 83-95.
Jensen, M.C. (1993) "The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control
systems" Journal of Finance 48, 831-880.
Harrigan, K.R. (1981) "Numbers and positions of women elected to corporate boards" Academy
of Management Journal 24, 619-625.
Matsa, D.A. and A.R. Miller (2013) "A female style in corporate leadership? Evidence from
quotas" American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5, 136-169.
Pearce, J.A. and S.A. Zahra (1992) "Board composition from a strategic contingency perspec-
tive" Journal of Management Studies 29, 411-438.
Rechner, P.L. and D.R. Dalton (1989) "The impact of CEO as board Chairperson on corporate
performance: Evidence vs rhetoric" Academy of Management Executive 3, 141-143.
Rechner, P.L. and D.R. Dalton (1991) "CEO duality and organizational performance: A longi-
tudinal analysis" Strategic Management Journal 12, 155-160.
Rhode, D. and A.K. Packel (2010) "Diversity on corporate boards: How much difference does
difference make?" Rock Center for Corporate Governance working paper number 89.
Yermack, D. (1996) "Higher valuation of companies with a small board of directors" Journal
of Financial Economics 40, 185-212.
596
Econom
ics Bulletin, 2014, Vol. 34 No. 1 pp. 589-604
Table 2: Numbers of firms and numbers of appointments by industries
Industry Nb. of firms Women’s appointment Men’s appointment
Number % Number %
Consumer Discretionnary 11 23 17 112 83
Consumer Staples 15 41 20 169 80
Energy 10 15 12 106 88
Financials 14 17 12 123 88
Health Care 10 29 17 137 83
Industrials 13 31 15 181 85
Information Technology 14 41 23 135 77
Others 13 28 46 149 54
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Table 3: Results of proportion test for the 3 types of risks (whole sample)
65 days 130 days 195 days 260 days
H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1
Total Risk
Male’s prop. 54.59 23.83 20.14 38.49 31.92 28.24 32.55 33.99 32.10 25.72 38.13 34.98
Female’s prop. 56.00 25.33 17.78 37.78 35.56 26.22 32.44 37.78 29.33 25.33 39.11 35.11
p-value 0.88 0.85 0.75 0.91 0.55 0.73 0.98 0.45 0.56 0.92 0.82 0.98
Systematic risk
Male’s prop. 84.80 13.58 0.00 81.56 16.82 0.00 79.32 19.06 0.00 75.72 22.66 0.00
Female’s prop. 84.89 14.22 0.00 79.56 19.56 0.00 76.44 22.67 0.00 76.44 22.67 0.00
p-value 0.99 0.92 n.c 0.69 0.58 n.c 0.51 0.39 n.c 0.85 0.99 n.c
Unsystematic risk
Male’s prop. 52.79 24.73 20.86 36.42 31.29 30.67 38.13 29.50 30.76 35.88 30.85 31.65
Female’s prop. 51.56 22.67 24.89 34.67 33.78 30.67 40.44 30.22 28.44 36.00 32.00 31.11
p-value 0.90 0.80 0.61 0.78 0.68 0.99 0.65 0.88 0.63 0.98 0.78 0.90
Notes: H0, the risk level is the same before and after the appointment; H
a
1 , the risk level before the appointment is higher than the risk level after the appointment and H
b
1 , the risk level before the appointment is lower
than the risk level after the appointment. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ mean that the proportion test is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. n.c means that the test statistic is not computed because data are
not available.
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Table 4: Results of proportion test for the total risk by industry
65 days 130 days 195 days 260 days
H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1
Cons. Discretionary
Male’s prop. 58.93 24.11 13.39 43.75 29.46 24.11 29.46 37.04 31.11 26.79 41.07 29.46
Female’s prop. 56.62 26.09 13.04 52.17 26.09 21.74 30.43 43.48 26.09 26.09 60.87 13.08
p-value 0.80 0.81 0.96 0.19 0.56 0.66 0.84 0.13 0.20 0.86 0.00∗ 0.00∗
Cons. Staples
Male’s prop. 57.40 25.44 17.16 39.05 27.81 33.14 33.73 30.77 35.50 26.63 34.91 38.46
Female’s prop. 60.98 19.51 19.51 31.71 36.59 31.71 29.27 41.46 29.27 21.95 36.59 41.46
p-value 0.70 0.46 0.75 0.23 0.14 0.81 0.36 0.03∗∗ 0.20 0.22 0.70 0.49
Energy
Male’s prop. 53.77 23.58 22.64 31.13 29.25 39.62 33.02 33.02 33.96 28.30 33.96 33.74
Female’s prop. 66.67 13.33 20.00 33.33 40.00 26.67 26.67 40.00 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33
p-value 0.16 0.16 0.74 0.64 0.02∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.18 0.16 0.90 0.22 0.88 0.30
Financials
Male’s prop. 59.35 17.89 20.33 39.84 28.46 29.27 31.71 39.02 26.83 21.14 44.72 33.33
Female’s prop. 52.94 29.41 17.65 52.94 35.29 11.75 47.06 23.53 29.41 25.53 41.18 35.29
p-value 0.50 0.15 0.72 0.04∗∗ 0.25 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.58 0.52 0.43 0.64
Notes: H0, the risk level is the same before and after the appointment; H
a
1 , the risk level before the appointment is higher than the risk level after the appointment and H
b
1 , the risk level before the appointment is lower
than the risk level after the appointment. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ mean that the proportion test is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. n.c means that the test statistic is not computed because data are
not available.
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Table 5: Results of proportion test for the total risk by industry (continued))
65 days 130 days 195 days 260 days
H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1
Health Care
Male’s prop. 44.53 29.93 24.09 38.69 29.20 30.66 33.58 33.58 31.39 24.09 38.69 35.77
Female’s prop. 55.17 31.03 13.79 34.48 44.83 20.69 34.48 31.03 34.48 17.24 41.38 41.38
p-value 0.26 0.90 0.16 0.50 0.01∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.85 0.60 0.53 0.06∗∗∗ 0.54 0.20
Industrials
Male’s prop. 59.61 23.20 18.78 40.33 30.39 28.18 37.02 31.49 30.39 28.18 35.36 35.36
Female’s prop. 58.06 16.13 22.58 32.26 32.26 32.26 25.81 32.26 38.71 25.81 35.48 35.48
p-value 0.90 0.35 0.62 0.19 0.75 0.49 0.02∗∗ 0.87 0.09∗∗∗ 0.55 0.98 0.98
Information technologies
Male’s prop. 54.07 22.96 20.74 30.37 42.22 25.19 28.15 43.70 25.93 21.48 43.70 32.59
Female’s prop. 48.78 29.27 21.95 36.59 39.02 24.39 29.27 41.46 29.27 29.27 31.71 39.02
p-value 0.58 0.45 0.88 0.31 0.61 0.87 0.81 0.66 0.47 0.04∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.13
Others
Male’s prop. 53.02 20.13 25.50 37.58 29.53 31.54 33.56 25.50 39.60 30.20 33.56 34.90
Female’s prop. 60.71 25.00 14.29 32.14 39.29 28.57 50.00 39.29 10.71 32.14 35.71 32.14
p-value 0.41 0.54 0.14 0.38 0.11 0.62 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.64 0.61 0.51
Notes: H0, the risk level is the same before and after the appointment; H
a
1 , the risk level before the appointment is higher than the risk level after the appointment and H
b
1 , the risk level before the appointment is lower
than the risk level after the appointment. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ mean that the proportion test is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. n.c means that the test statistic is not computed because data are
not available.
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Table 6: Results of proportion test for the systematic risk by industry
65 days 130 days 195 days 260 days
H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1
Cons. Discretionary
Male’s prop. 84.82 11.61 0.00 79.46 16.96 0.00 76.79 19.64 0.00 71.43 25.00 0.00
Female’s prop. 78.26 17.83 0.00 86.96 8.70 0.00 73.91 21.74 0.00 73.91 21.74 0.00
p-value 0.37 0.39 n.c 0.12 0.05∗∗∗ n.c 0.52 0.62 n.c 0.53 0.39 n.c
Cons. Staples
Male’s prop. 85.71 14.29 0.00 84.52 15.48 0.00 80.95 19.05 0.00 76.19 23.81 0.00
Female’s prop. 97.56 2.44 0.00 87.80 12.20 0.00 85.37 14.63 0.00 87.80 12.20 0.00
p-value 0.02∗∗ 0.03∗∗ n.c 0.46 0.46 n.c 0.26 0.27 n.c 0.00∗ 0.00∗ n.c
Energy
Male’s prop. 82.08 17.92 0.00 87.74 12.26 0.00 87.74 12.26 0.00 82.08 17.92 0.00
Female’s prop. 93.33 6.67 0.00 93.33 6.67 0.00 80.00 20.00 0.00 80.00 20.00 0.00
p-value 0.07 0.08 n.c 0.14 0.13 n.c 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ n.c 0.55 0.55 n.c
Financials
Male’s prop. 86.18 10.57 0.00 74.80 21.95 0.00 74.80 21.95 0.00 73.98 22.76 0.00
Female’s prop. 70.59 29.41 0.00 70.59 29.41 0.00 64.71 35.29 0.00 58.82 41.18 0.00
p-value 0.04∗∗ 0.01∗∗ n.c 0.46 0.18 n.c 0.03∗∗ 0.00∗ n.c 0.00∗ 0.00∗ n.c
Notes: H0, the risk level is the same before and after the appointment; H
a
1 , the risk level before the appointment is higher than the risk level after the appointment and H
b
1 , the risk level before the appointment is lower
than the risk level after the appointment. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ mean that the proportion test is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. n.c means that the test statistic is not computed because data are
not available.
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Table 7: Results of proportion test for the systematic risk by industry (continued))
65 days 130 days 195 days 260 days
H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1
Health Care
Male’s prop. 88.86 11.68 0.00 78.10 20.44 0.00 72.99 25.55 0.00 69.34 29.20 0.00
Female’s prop. 86.21 13.79 0.00 75.86 24.14 0.00 79.31 20.69 0.00 79.31 20.69 0.00
p-value 0.92 0.74 n.c 0.68 0.49 n.c 0.15 0.27 n.c 0.01∗∗ 0.03∗∗ n.c
Industrials
Male’s prop. 83.98 14.92 0.00 83.43 15.47 0.00 80.66 18.23 0.00 77.35 21.55 0.00
Female’s prop. 83.87 12.90 0.00 83.87 12.90 0.00 77.42 19.35 0.00 87.10 9.68 0.00
p-value 0.99 0.76 n.c 0.93 0.57 n.c 0.44 0.78 n.c 0.00∗ 0.00∗ n.c
Information technologies
Male’s prop. 84.44 13.33 0.00 87.41 10.37 0.00 82.96 14.81 0.00 81.48 16.30 0.00
Female’s prop. 78.05 21.95 0.00 75.61 24.39 0.00 78.05 21.95 0.00 68.29 31.71 0.00
p-value 0.39 0.23 n.c 0.02∗∗ 0.00∗ n.c 0.23 0.08∗∗∗ n.c 0.00∗ 0.00∗ n.c
Others
Male’s prop. 84.56 14.09 0.00 77.18 21.48 0.00 78.52 20.13 0.00 74.50 24.16 0.00
Female’s prop. 85.71 14.29 0.00 64.29 35.71 0.00 64.29 35.71 0.00 67.86 32.14 0.00
p-value 0.87 0.98 n.c 0.03∗∗ 0.01∗ n.c 0.00∗ 0.00∗ n.c 0.10 0.05∗∗∗ n.c
Notes: H0, the risk level is the same before and after the appointment; H
a
1 , the risk level before the appointment is higher than the risk level after the appointment and H
b
1 , the risk level before the appointment is lower
than the risk level after the appointment. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ mean that the proportion test is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. n.c means that the test statistic is not computed because data are
not available.
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Table 8: Results of proportion test for the unsystematic risk by industry
65 days 130 days 195 days 260 days
H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1
Cons. Discretionary
Male’s prop. 58.04 24.11 14.29 41.07 31.25 24.11 38.39 28.57 29.46 33.93 30.36 32.14
Female’s prop. 52.17 21.74 21.74 43.48 30.43 21.74 47.83 30.43 17.39 39.13 30.43 26.09
p-value 0.54 0.77 0.31 0.71 0.89 0.66 0.07∗∗∗ 0.69 0.01∗∗ 0.23 0.98 0.14
Cons. Staples
Male’s prop. 56.55 22.02 21.43 39.88 33.33 26.75 42.26 29.17 28.57 41.07 29.17 29.76
Female’s prop. 51.22 19.51 29.27 34.15 34.15 31.71 39.02 31.1 29.27 31.71 26.83 41.46
p-value 0.57 0.75 0.34 0.36 0.89 0.40 0.53 0.60 0.88 0.03∗∗ 0.56 0.01∗∗
Energy
Male’s prop. 53.77 27.36 18.87 34.91 31.13 33.96 35.85 30.19 33.96 36.79 29.25 33.96
Female’s prop. 66.67 20.00 13.33 46.67 33.33 20.00 53.33 40.00 6.67 53.33 33.33 13.33
p-value 0.16 0.36 0.43 0.06∗∗∗ 0.72 0.01∗∗ 0.00∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.32 0.00∗
Financials
Male’s prop. 47.97 27.64 21.14 26.83 34.96 34.15 33.33 35.77 27.64 26.83 36.59 33.33
Female’s prop. 47.05 23.53 29.41 23.53 47.06 29.41 47.06 29.41 23.53 29.41 35.29 35.29
p-value 0.92 0.62 0.32 0.55 0.05∗∗∗ 0.43 0.01∗∗ 0.19 0.36 0.52 0.76 0.64
Notes: H0, the risk level is the same before and after the appointment; H
a
1 , the risk level before the appointment is higher than the risk level after the appointment and H
b
1 , the risk level before the appointment is lower
than the risk level after the appointment. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ mean that the proportion test is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. n.c means that the test statistic is not computed because data are
not available.
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Table 9: Results of proportion test for the unsystematic risk by industry (continued))
65 days 130 days 195 days 260 days
H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1 H0 H
a
1 H
b
1
Health Care
Male’s prop. 45.26 27.74 25.55 33.58 30.66 34.31 34.31 27.74 36.50 32.12 29.93 36.50
Female’s prop. 62.07 27.59 10.34 37.93 44.83 17.24 41.38 37.93 20.69 24.14 55.17 20.69
p-value 0.07∗∗∗ 0.99 0.03∗∗ 0.48 0.02∗∗ 0.00∗ 0.16 0.04∗∗ 0.00∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗
Industrials
Male’s prop. 59.12 22.65 17.13 37.57 32.04 29.28 41.44 30.39 27.07 36.46 32.04 30.39
Female’s prop. 51.61 19.35 25.81 19.35 38.71 38.71 19.35 38.71 38.71 32.26 29.03 35.48
p-value 0.43 0.67 0.26 0.00∗ 0.28 0.12 0.00∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.32 0.46 0.22
Information technologies
Male’s prop. 51.11 23.70 22.96 31.11 31.85 34.81 34.07 30.37 33.33 37.04 31.85 28.89
Female’s prop. 41.46 21.95 36.59 26.83 34.15 39.02 39.02 26.83 34.15 43.90 31.71 24.39
p-value 0.31 0.83 0.11 0.46 0.71 0.50 0.32 0.45 0.87 0.12 0.97 0.25
Others
Male’s prop. 48.99 24.83 24.83 37.58 26.17 34.90 42.28 24.48 31.54 40.27 28.19 30.20
Female’s prop. 50.00 28.57 21.43 32.29 21.43 39.29 50.00 10.71 39.29 39.29 17.86 42.86
p-value 0.92 0.66 0.67 0.79 0.39 0.48 0.14 0.00∗ 0.12 0.82 0.01∗∗ 0.00∗
Notes: H0, the risk level is the same before and after the appointment; H
a
1 , the risk level before the appointment is higher than the risk level after the appointment and H
b
1 , the risk level before the appointment is lower
than the risk level after the appointment. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ mean that the proportion test is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. n.c means that the test statistic is not computed because data are
not available.
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